Twenty Years of Evidence. Nine Years of Inquiries. £1.5 Million Legal Costs. Still No Report.

This article sets out a series of questions which I am putting directly to Unite General Secretary Sharon Graham, Legal Director Stephen Pinder and the legal team conducting Unite's Independent Blacklisting Collusion Inquiry.

I remain a member of Unite. I have spent more than twenty years providing the union with evidence about construction industry blacklisting and attempting to establish what happened to the workers affected.

Before considering what Unite has done with that evidence, it is important to understand something which has been evident for at least the last thirteen years.

There was not simply one construction blacklist.

The evidence I have obtained over the years points to at least three different mechanisms through which information about construction workers was shared.

Three different blacklisting systems

1. The Consulting Association

The Consulting Association operated a centralised system between participating construction companies and the Consulting Association.

Construction employers supplied information to the Association and obtained information from it when checking workers.

This was the system exposed after the Information Commissioner's Office raided the Consulting Association in 2009.

2. The EMCOR Drake and Scull, Sheila Knight blacklists

The Sheila Knight material revealed something different.

These were blacklists involving the direct sharing of information between two construction companies (EMCOR Drake & Scull and Balfour Beatty Engineering), relating to workers on three major projects:

• Jubilee Line Extension
• Royal Opera House
• Pfizer

The lists contained the names and national insurance numbers of more than 500 workers.

Drake & Scull was centrally involved in compiling and sharing this material.

These lists existed outside the formal Consulting Association mechanism. However, I was subsequently able to identify workers and information appearing in both the Sheila Knight material and the Consulting Association records.

That is important because it demonstrates that blacklisting information did not have to sit inside the Consulting Association database to be connected with it.

3. The David Craggs blacklists

The David Craggs lists reveal a third and different route again.

These were lists circulated to third-party recruitment agencies supplying labour to the construction industry.

That distinction is crucial.

The Consulting Association was a system between construction companies and a central blacklisting organisation.

The Sheila Knight material involved companies sharing information directly with each other.

The Craggs material concerns lists being circulated through the recruitment-agency labour supply chain.

By 2005, recruitment agencies had become an increasingly important route through which construction companies obtained labour. A recruitment agency could therefore affect whether a worker was ever put forward for employment in the first place.

The Craggs material potentially provided an important lead into how blacklisting information could circulate through this different route.

There is also a significant chronology.

Craggs's employment history shows:

• Balfour Beatty's Haden Young – 1990 to 2005
• Rotary North West – 2005 to 2011
• EMCOR Drake & Scull – 2011 to 2013

The unredacted Craggs mechanical and electrical blacklists, which I eventually sent to Unite in December 2024, covered the period beginning in 2005 and continuing through to 2013.

The starting point at Haden Young is particularly significant because the Haden Young blacklist-checking sheets formed part of the documentary evidence which ultimately helped expose the Consulting Association system.

So the obvious investigative question is:

Were these genuinely three separate blacklisting systems, or were they different channels through which the same or related information about workers was circulating?

That question is important to this article not because the present inquiry was established to reinvestigate construction blacklisting itself, but because the existence of these different systems provides important context for examining what union officials knew, what evidence they received, what they did with it, and whether evidence of blacklisting was suppressed, ignored or otherwise prevented from being properly pursued.

The relevant questions for the present inquiry are therefore:

• Has the inquiry established what Unite, Amicus and UCATT officials knew about these different blacklisting systems, and when they knew it?
• Has it established which officials received evidence concerning the Consulting Association, Sheila Knight and David Craggs material?
• Has it examined what those officials did with that evidence?
• Has it examined whether information concerning any of these systems was suppressed, ignored or otherwise prevented from being properly investigated?
• Has it examined whether any union official colluded with employers or others in relation to the use, circulation or concealment of blacklisting information?
• Has it examined whether the treatment of evidence concerning these different systems formed part of the alleged collusion or cover-up which the present inquiry was established to investigate?

Why was Emcor Drake & Scull not pursued more broadly?

There is another striking feature running through these three systems: Emcor Drake & Scull appears repeatedly.

• In the Consulting Association system, Drake & Scull was a participating construction company and supplied information on workers.
• In the Sheila Knight system, its involvement is much more direct: EMCOR Drake & Scull and Balfour Beatty Engineering were centrally involved in compiling and sharing the blacklists covering more than 500 workers on the Jubilee Line Extension, Royal Opera House and Pfizer projects.
• In the Craggs material, there is another direct connection. Craggs's employment history ran from Balfour Beatty's Haden Young (1990–2005), to Rotary North West (2005–2011), to EMCOR Drake & Scull (2011–2013), during the wider period relevant to the lists circulated to third-party recruitment agencies.

That makes what subsequently happened during the High Court blacklisting litigation particularly important.

On Tuesday 27 October 2015, after attending a job interview in London, I met Justin Bowden of the GMB, who was closely involved in the union's blacklisting litigation. I recall him telling me that, in effect, the fight was over and the litigation was going to be settled.

I asked him about the unions' position. He told me that Unite wanted out. When I asked what that meant for the GMB, he said the potential legal costs — which he put at around £25 million — represented too great a risk.

The High Court litigation itself was, however, still continuing. Less than two weeks later, on 9 November 2015, Michael Newman of Leigh Day wrote to a GMB claimant about which defendants the union would continue to pursue. The claimant was asked to accept an apology from Emcor Group (UK) plc in return for dropping his claim against it. Newman explained that GMB had decided to focus on companies represented by Macfarlanes, against which there were hundreds of claimants, while this claimant was the only claimant pursuing Emcor.

“They will continue to support your blacklisting claim against Sir Robert McAlpine and Carillion.”

For this claimant, however, Emcor Drake & Scull was the company which had actually supplied the blacklisting information about him to the Consulting Association. Neither Sir Robert McAlpine nor Carillion had supplied the information recorded about him.

The financial consequences of continuing without GMB support were then made explicit.

“Emcor have served documents on us last week saying their legal costs are in excess of £2 million.”

“If you wanted to continue your claim against Emcor without GMB's representation, then you would have to fund the claim yourself (including the barristers and any legal fees). You would also be responsible for Emcor's legal costs if the claim was unsuccessful.”

The following day, the claimant wrote to Leigh Day confirming that he had “reluctantly agreed to the GMB request” to release Emcor from the GMB-supported legal action.

That raises some obvious questions:

• How many High Court claimants originally had claims against Emcor Drake & Scull?
• How many of those claims were subsequently dropped, discontinued or released?
• Who decided that should happen?
• What was the legal reasoning?
• Were other GMB claimants encouraged or required to release claims against Emcor or other defendants?
• Were Unite or UCATT claimants given the same or similar advice about claims against Emcor Drake & Scull?
• Did Unite or UCATT claimants subsequently drop, discontinue or release claims against Emcor Drake & Scull, and if so, how many?
• Were Blacklist Support Group claimants given the same or similar advice?
• Did the claimant legal teams agree a common strategy about which construction companies would ultimately be pursued?
• What consideration was given to the Sheila Knight evidence when those decisions were made?
• Did the legal teams know that workers appearing in the Sheila Knight material also appeared in Consulting Association records?
• Given Drake & Scull's significance in that material, why did the company not remain a major focus of the litigation?

Those are questions about the litigation itself. But they also raise questions which appear directly relevant to the remit of the present inquiry:

• Has the inquiry examined what role Unite or UCATT officials played in decisions about which defendants were pursued, dropped or transferred during the High Court litigation?
• Has it established which union officials participated in, were consulted about or were informed of those decisions?
• Has it examined whether any decisions concerning Emcor Drake & Scull were influenced by union officials rather than being purely legal decisions made by the claimant legal teams?
• Has it examined whether the handling of the Sheila Knight evidence during the litigation is relevant to the allegations of union collusion, suppression or cover-up which the inquiry was established to examine?
• Has the inquiry examined why Unite was reluctant to rely on me as a witness in the High Court litigation, including the contemporary assessment that there was a risk of me making “accusations about union activity”?

This is particularly relevant because John Carl Townsend KC was involved in the High Court blacklisting litigation and was subsequently appointed to lead Sharon Graham's independent inquiry.

Has the current inquiry examined the role played by union officials in those litigation decisions, including what they knew about the evidence concerning Emcor Drake & Scull and the Sheila Knight material?

The High Court litigation also produced allegations about me

There is another reason why the High Court litigation matters personally to me.

For several years I had worked with senior people at the GMB and its lawyers in connection with blacklisting. Michael Newman of Leigh Day acted as a lawyer in matters involving me.

I subsequently discovered through subject access material that allegations had been included in High Court claimant cases which portrayed me as having been involved in blacklisting workers at Skanska on the Jubilee Line Extension.

At this point in time, my employment history had been clearly set out and checked by the lawyers, and it was very clear to all involved that I'd never worked at Skanska or blacklisted anyone.

The allegations were particularly extraordinary given that I was the person who had spent years exposing blacklisting evidence, including the very Jubilee Line material involved.

An email circulated within the claimant legal teams in February 2016 also contained the following assessment of whether Unite should rely on me as a witness:

“Unite are not convinced about the merits of relying / being seen to rely on him. He is perceived as unpredictable.”

“The risk of him giving damaging evidence on limitation and making accusations about union activity probably outweigh the benefits of serving a witness summary.”

That raises further questions which go directly to the remit of the present inquiry:

• Did Unite or UCATT claimant cases contain allegations about me materially similar to those appearing in the GMB cases?
• If so, who supplied those allegations?
• Who approved them?
• What evidence was relied upon?
• What “union activity” was being referred to when the claimant legal team recorded the risk of me making “accusations about union activity”?
• Which Unite or UCATT officials were involved in discussions about whether I should be relied upon as a witness?
• Has the present inquiry identified and interviewed those officials?
• Has the inquiry examined whether allegations made about me within the litigation affected the ability of evidence concerning alleged union involvement in blacklisting to be heard?
• Has the inquiry examined how those allegations originated and whether they circulated between claimant legal teams or union officials?

This did not begin in 2024

I first raised construction blacklisting evidence with my union almost twenty years ago.

In 2005, I provided Amicus official Mick Tuff with evidence including:

• the Haden Young blacklist-checking sheets; and
• the Drake & Scull / Balfour material relating to more than 500 workers from the Royal Opera House, Pfizer and Jubilee Line Extension projects.

Mr Tuff initially said that the evidence would be investigated.

In 2006, after becoming increasingly concerned that nothing was happening, I wrote repeatedly to then General Secretary Derek Simpson.

The union's solicitors, Rowley Ashworth, were also in possession of my blacklisting evidence. At around the same period I assisted them in connection with another union member's claim against Drake & Scull, including providing evidence and agreeing to attend as a witness. That case subsequently settled before the hearing.

In November 2012, I gave evidence to the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee and raised the union's handling of my blacklisting evidence directly.

I was subsequently invited to submit further written evidence, with the Committee Chair making clear that written evidence submitted to the inquiry would be published on its website unless it had been marked confidential or secret.

In March 2013, I then supplied further material, including a detailed account of alleged trade-union cover-up and complicity, together with evidence concerning the David Craggs blacklists.

That further material was not published with the Committee's evidence.

I also raised the David Craggs lists.

In 2017, under Len McCluskey, another investigation into allegations of union involvement in blacklisting was announced.

At that time I submitted an extensive report to Len McCluskey setting out the evidence I had accumulated concerning blacklisting, alleged trade-union involvement, the treatment of my earlier evidence and other matters which I believed required investigation. I specifically argued that the scope of the proposed inquiry needed to extend much further than simply examining officer collusion.

The significance of that report was subsequently recorded in Parliament. My then MP, David Hanson, told the House of Commons that I had produced a “detailed report” concerning my experiences and dealings with trade unions and construction companies, and that I had submitted it to Len McCluskey as well as to the Government.

In 2019, another inquiry followed. Richard Arthur of Thompsons told me that the investigation would be “full and transparent” and confirmed that its scope included the possible suppression of blacklisting information by union officers.

He also confirmed that the circumstances surrounding Unite's treatment of the Craggs material in 2018 would be investigated.

Where are the findings?

In January 2023, material circulated by Unite Executive Council members Tony Seaman and Frank Morris in connection with the blacklisting campaign stated:

“There have been four previous internal investigations, but none of them got anywhere near the truth.”

That statement alone generates a series of questions:

• What were those four investigations?
• When did each begin and end?
• Who conducted them?
• How much did each cost?
• What evidence was gathered?
• What findings were made?
• Where are the reports?
• Was the evidence from those investigations transferred to Sharon Graham's present inquiry?

The David Craggs lists: Unite acted on his complaint. What did it do for the 200 blacklisted workers?

The union's treatment of the David Craggs material deserves particular scrutiny.

On 2 October 2018, Craggs complained to Unite about material I had published concerning his lists.

On 4 October 2018, Unite wrote to me following that complaint and asked me to remove references to Craggs in order to avoid possible further action by him or the union.

I escalated the matter shortly afterwards to senior people within Unite, including Andrew Murray and Len McCluskey.

The central question is straightforward:

Why was Unite able to act promptly following a complaint by David Craggs about me, yet what identifiable action did it take for the workers whose names appeared on the lists I was trying to expose?

In 2019, Richard Arthur from Thompsons told me that the circumstances surrounding the 4 October 2018 letter would form part of the investigation he was conducting.

I raised the Craggs matter again with Sharon Graham in 2021 and with Stephen Pinder in 2023.

Then, after correcting an earlier attachment, on 22 December 2024 I sent Stephen Pinder — copying Sharon Graham and Karen Ogden — the actual unredacted Craggs mechanical and electrical blacklists circulated to employment agency suppliers.

My own ability to compare the Craggs material with the Consulting Association records was necessarily limited. I did not have general access to the Consulting Association files, which related to individual workers.

Despite that very limited access, I was able to identify at least one plumber whose name appeared across all three sets of blacklisting material: the Consulting Association records, the Sheila Knight material and the David Craggs lists.

That overlap does not establish that the three systems were the same system. But it provided an obvious evidential lead when considering what union officials knew about the different blacklisting mechanisms and how they responded to the evidence placed before them.

The significance of providing the Craggs material to Unite was therefore not simply that the union had been given another blacklist. The important question for the present inquiry is what Unite and its officials knew about the Craggs material, what they did with it, and whether its treatment forms part of the alleged suppression or cover-up which the inquiry was established to examine.

• Has the present inquiry established what Unite or its predecessor unions knew about the David Craggs lists, and when they first knew it?
• Has it examined why Unite was able to act within days following Craggs's complaint about my publication of the lists in October 2018, while I can identify no comparable action on behalf of the workers whose names appeared on them?
• Has it examined who authorised Unite's 4 October 2018 letter to me and what consideration those officials gave to the underlying blacklisting evidence?
• Has it examined whether any union official discouraged, obstructed, suppressed or failed to pursue investigation of the Craggs material?
• Has it established what happened to that evidence during the 2019 investigation, after Richard Arthur told me that the circumstances surrounding Unite's treatment of the Craggs material would be investigated?
• Was the unredacted Craggs material I supplied again in December 2024 passed to the present inquiry legal team?
• Was it passed to any forensic investigators working for the inquiry?
• If so, when was it supplied, by whom, and what investigation followed?
• Was it examined for what it might reveal about the conduct and knowledge of union officials, rather than simply as evidence that another blacklist existed?
• If the Craggs material was not considered relevant to an inquiry into alleged union collusion, suppression and cover-up, why not?

Who scoped and oversaw Sharon Graham's inquiry?

I raised concerns about the people involved in this process before the present inquiry was established.

On 4 October 2021, I wrote to Sharon Graham raising concerns involving figures including Dave Smith, Frank Morris and Tony Seaman.

Sharon indicated that she would meet relevant people and come back to me.

I did not receive the promised substantive response.

In December 2021 Sharon subsequently told me:

“My leading construction members have scoped the inquiry... I have full confidence in them doing this in the proper manner.”

That makes the identity and role of those construction members important.

Tony Seaman, Rule 27 and the treatment of complaints

Tony Seaman was a Unite Executive Council construction representative and was one of the individuals about whom I had repeatedly raised concerns.

Among material I supplied to Sharon were messages attributed to Seaman which included:

“Here you cheeky cunt. You have anything to say meet us in Holborn.”

“You blacklisting Cunt. You ruined men's lives.”

I understood the invitation to “meet us in Holborn” in that context as a threat.

I also raised sexist social-media material attributed to him and a separate racist social-media issue which became the subject of a Unite investigation.

In November 2022 Unite confirmed that its investigation had concluded that the posting in question was racist. Seaman's response and expression of regret were considered and no Rule 27 disciplinary proceedings followed.

I raised these matters again with Sharon in January 2023.

Against that background, my 2025 Subject Access Request disclosed a very different approach to complaints about me.

On 2 October 2024, an internal Unite exchange referred to my increasingly explicit allegations about “corruption and cover up around blacklisting” and asked:

“Is there something we can do?”

An internal response described me as a “constant complainer” with a “poor reputation”.

A further exchange on 8 October 2024 stated:

“The other option is R27.”

An Executive Council member had also complained internally about me shortly beforehand, accusing me of trying to slander and defame people and suggesting that social-media messages could have been fabricated.

The identity of that individual is redacted in the SAR material.

• Was that Executive Council member Tony Seaman?
• If so, what investigation was carried out into his complaint?
• Was I ever told that such a complaint had been made?
• Was I given any opportunity to answer it?
• Roy Bentham and Frank Morris were also involved in those social media messages. Were they asked to confirm the authenticity of relevant communications?
• Why was Rule 27 being discussed internally in relation to me?
• Why was no complaint or allegation ever put to me?
• Who were the “leading construction members” who scoped Sharon Graham's inquiry?
• What role, if any, did Tony Seaman play in scoping, overseeing or influencing that inquiry?

Suzanne Muna, PILC and the independence of the inquiry

There is a further governance issue which I formally raised in January 2025.

When the current inquiry was established in March/April 2022, its legal team included:

• John Carl Townsend KC
• Nick Randall KC
• Paul Heron of the Public Interest Law Centre (PILC)

The public presentation of the inquiry emphasised that it was independent of Unite and its existing legal structures.

However, there was a relationship which I believed required explanation.

Paul Heron was the founder and lead solicitor at PILC.

He resigned as a director of the previous PILC company on 11 September 2020. On the same day, Suzanne Muna became a director.

Muna later became a Unite Executive Council member and subsequently a trustee of the new PILC charity.

PILC's own trustees' reporting recorded that it had been formally instructed in March 2022 to act as solicitors to the independent Unite inquiry. It also described an oversight structure involving two Unite Executive Committee members from the construction sector and the chair of the Blacklist Support Group.

Those facts do not by themselves establish wrongdoing. They do, however, give rise to legitimate questions about disclosure, independence and safeguards.

On 15 January 2025, I sent a detailed communication specifically raising the relationship between Suzanne Muna, PILC and the independence of the inquiry.

It was addressed to Sharon Graham, Stephen Pinder, Suzanne Muna and a wide group of Executive Council and Unite recipients.

• What consideration did Unite give to the relationship between Muna and PILC?
• Was that relationship disclosed to the inquiry's participants?
• Was it considered when the inquiry's independence arrangements were established?
• What safeguards were put in place?
• What role did the construction-sector Executive Council members on the oversight structure perform?
• Who were those members?

Then I discovered that Unite had secretly restricted and diverted my emails

I had been raising my concerns directly with Sharon Graham and Stephen Pinder since 2021.

At the time, I had no idea that in October 2024 Unite had taken steps to restrict my communications.

I only discovered this through my Subject Access Request in April 2025.

On 14 October 2024, an internal communication stated:

“This member circulates a lot of long abusive and defamatory emails about other members, and about colleagues... It has reached the point when it has to stop.”

It then requested:

“I would like this email account to be blocked from every Unite account apart from that of [redacted].”

The person requesting the restriction also stated:

“I review the emails received from time to time...”

The identity of that person is redacted.

The following day, 15 October 2024, Unite's internal IT correspondence discussed the technical arrangement.

An IT message referred to a previous configuration and explained:

“What we did for [redacted] is create an internal mailbox, that we diverted all mail to – we them [sic] granted your colleague access to this internal mailbox...”

The IT employee then asked:

“do you want the same setup for alanwainwright1963@gmail.com?”

The response was:

“Thanks and yes.”

This therefore appears to have been considerably more than an ordinary spam block.

Unite's own records describe an internal mailbox, diversion of communications and access being provided to selected personnel.

• Who requested this arrangement?
• Who authorised it?
• Who was the redacted individual to whom my emails were still allowed to go?
• Who was the “colleague” given access to the internal mailbox?
• Who had access to that mailbox?
• Who was the individual who said: “I review the emails received from time to time”?
• Who authorised that person to review communications addressed to the General Secretary, Legal Director, Executive Council members and others?
• Does Unite retain access logs showing who opened or read those emails?
• Why was I never informed that this was happening?
• Why was no allegation put to me and no opportunity provided for me to respond before such an exceptional measure was imposed?

What happened to my January 2025 complaints while the email system was operating?

This is where the chronology becomes particularly important.

On 8 January 2025, I submitted a complaint to the Certification Officer concerning Unite and blacklisting-related governance issues.

That complaint was also copied to Sharon Graham, Stephen Pinder and members of the Executive Council on 8 January 2025.

On 10 January 2025, an internal Unite email discussed it.

The author referred to the fact that more than 100 people had received a lengthy document concerning my Certification Officer complaint and wrote:

“I have not acknowledged receipt of the email and do not propose any action.”

That is important.

Whatever the precise technical operation of the restriction, my communication had plainly been read, considered and discussed internally.

Five days later, on 15 January 2025, I sent the separate detailed communication concerning Suzanne Muna, PILC and the independence of the inquiry.

At that point I still had no idea that Unite had imposed the email restriction three months earlier.

• Who read the January 2025 Certification Officer material?
• To whom were its contents communicated internally?
• Why was a conscious decision made not to acknowledge it or take action?
• Was my 15 January email concerning Muna and PILC diverted into the internal mailbox?
• If so, who read it?
• Were Sharon Graham, Stephen Pinder, Suzanne Muna and the Executive Council made aware of it or its contents?
• What action, if any, was taken in response to the concerns I raised about the independence of the inquiry?

£1,555,024.56 — what has the inquiry cost, and where is the 2026 work?

I subsequently exercised my rights as a Unite member to obtain accounting information relating to the present inquiry.

The records supplied identify expenditure totalling:

£1,555,024.56 including VAT.

The first identifiable posting in the records supplied is dated 17 May 2022.

The last is dated 26 January 2026 and relates to work undertaken in December 2025.

I can identify no transaction in the material supplied for inquiry work undertaken during 2026.

That does not prove that no work took place in 2026. There may have been delayed invoices, unbilled work, expenditure under another accounting code or another explanation.

But it is precisely why the question needs answering.

It also leaves a separate question about the earlier investigations announced before 2022, for which I can identify no obvious accounting trail in the records supplied to me.

• What was the total cost of the 2017 inquiry?
• What was the total cost of the 2019 inquiry?
• Under which accounting codes were those investigations recorded?
• What reports or other work product did Unite receive for that expenditure?
• Who has undertaken work on the present inquiry during 2026?
• When was that work undertaken?
• Who authorised it?
• Has it been invoiced?
• If so, where are those transactions recorded?
• If it has not yet been invoiced, what costs have accrued?

31 July 2026 — a “significant new line of inquiry”

Then came another important development.

On 31 July 2026, the inquiry legal team announced that:

“a significant line of inquiry has recently emerged that requires careful examination.”

The legal team explained that this had resulted in further delay to publication of the report.

The timing matters.

31 July was in the immediate run-up to the conclusion of Unite's 2026 General Secretary election, while members were still voting.

Ballot papers had been issued in July and voting did not close until 11 August 2026. The result was announced on 12 August 2026.

I make no allegation that the 31 July announcement was made because of the General Secretary election.

However, given its timing during the ballot, and given everything I had already raised, the chronology plainly warrants an explanation.

The announcement also came approximately eighteen months after my January 2025 Certification Officer complaint was demonstrably being read and discussed internally, and after my specific 15 January 2025 communication raising concerns about Muna, PILC and the independence of the inquiry.

So I am asking directly:

• What was the “significant new line of inquiry”?
• Did it concern alleged conduct, collusion, suppression of evidence or cover-up by any current or former union official?
• When precisely did it first emerge?
• Who identified it?
• Who brought it to the inquiry legal team's attention?
• When did the inquiry first receive the evidence which gave rise to it?
• Had that evidence previously been supplied to Unite itself and, if so, when?
• Was it connected in any way with matters I had raised in my 8 January 2025 Certification Officer complaint?
• Was it connected in any way with my 15 January 2025 communication concerning Suzanne Muna, PILC and the independence of the inquiry?
• Was it connected with the Craggs blacklist material I had supplied in December 2024?
• Was it connected with the High Court litigation issues I had raised?
• If it was unrelated to all of those matters, what exactly was it?
• What investigation was subsequently undertaken?
• Who undertook that work?
• When was it undertaken?
• Where is the corresponding accounting record?
• Has that line of inquiry now been concluded?
• What is the current status of the report?

From “unreasonable” emails to “unlawful harassment”

By 2026, because of the continuing email restriction, my correspondence with Stephen Pinder had been reduced to physical letters.

In a letter dated 10 July 2026, Steve referred to some of my previous emails as containing text which he could describe:

“at the least as being unreasonable”

On 14 September 2026, Steve emailed me and went significantly further.

He referred to:

“the highly abusive and unreasonable content of your emails”

and said my approach had become:

“increasingly personalised and abusive.”

He then stated that my conduct:

“would have amounted to unlawful harassment”

That was an extremely serious escalation in the language being used about me.

I responded by physical letter on the same day.

I pointed out that no allegation of harassment had ever been put to me at the time, either formally or informally, and I had never been given an opportunity to respond to such an allegation.

I asked Steve to identify the particular communications and evidence upon which the assertion of unlawful harassment was based.

I also pointed out that my SAR disclosed internal descriptions of my emails as “abusive” and “defamatory”, but I could identify no complaint, finding or substantive evidence supporting those descriptions.

Steve's email also contained a revealing practical detail.

He said that he had received notification that I had sent a further email concerning blacklisting, but that he was unable to see the text unless the system was altered.

So, almost two years after the October 2024 decision, the restriction was still interfering with the Legal Director's ability to read a member's communications about the blacklisting inquiry.

• Which particular communications are said to have constituted harassment?
• Who is said to have been harassed?
• Was any complaint of harassment made at the time?
• If so, by whom?
• Was it investigated?
• Why was the allegation never put to me?
• On what basis was “unlawful harassment” asserted in September 2026?
• Why was the email restriction still preventing Unite's Legal Director from reading relevant blacklisting correspondence in September 2026?

The question Unite now needs to answer

There is a danger of losing sight of the central issue among all these dates, inquiries and internal communications.

So it is worth returning to where this article began.

I have spent twenty years trying to get proper scrutiny of evidence pointing to at least three different mechanisms through which construction blacklisting information circulated:

• Construction companies ↔ Consulting Association
• Company ↔ company through the Sheila Knight material
• Employers / labour supply chain → third-party recruitment agencies through the Craggs material

There are identifiable links between those systems.

There are workers appearing across different records.

There are companies appearing repeatedly.

Emcor Drake & Scull is particularly significant.

There are unanswered questions about why claims against companies such as Emcor were apparently narrowed or discontinued during the High Court litigation.

There are unanswered questions about allegations made about me within that litigation.

There are unanswered questions about the David Craggs lists and why Unite acted quickly following his complaint about me while I can identify no comparable action for the workers whose names appeared on those lists.

But the purpose of Unite's present inquiry is not simply to establish whether construction workers were blacklisted. The central issue is what union officials knew, what they did, whether any officials colluded in blacklisting, and whether evidence was subsequently suppressed or covered up.

That is why the history of these three different blacklisting systems matters. They provide three substantial bodies of evidence against which the knowledge, actions and decisions of union officials can be examined.

There are earlier inquiries whose reports and findings remain unclear.

There are questions about who scoped and oversaw the present inquiry.

There are questions about the relationship between an Executive Council member and the law centre engaged by the supposedly independent inquiry.

There is now an inquiry costing at least £1,555,024.56 in the accounting records supplied to me.

There is a July 2026 announcement of a “significant new line of inquiry”, but no identifiable accounting entry in the records supplied to me for work undertaken during 2026.

And while I was repeatedly trying to raise these matters with Unite's General Secretary, Legal Director and Executive Council, the union secretly imposed a system which diverted and restricted my emails without telling me.

Its own records show that somebody was reviewing those communications “from time to time”.

Its own records show that my Certification Officer complaint was being read and discussed internally.

And its own Legal Director subsequently confirmed by WhatsApp that the restriction was still preventing him from reading my communications in September 2026.

Whatever Unite says its intention was, the practical effect was to restrict a union member's attempts to raise potentially serious blacklisting and governance concerns with the people responsible for addressing them.

After twenty years, I no longer regard the repeated silence, unpublished investigations, selective responses and restriction of my communications as matters which can simply be considered in isolation from one another.

Taken together, they raise a serious concern that Unite has repeatedly avoided full scrutiny and disclosure of matters which could be deeply embarrassing to the union.

If that concern is wrong, there is a straightforward way to demonstrate it.

Answer the questions.

Right of reply for forthcoming feature documentary

My original eight-part documentary series on construction blacklisting, produced in 2021, is currently being developed into a 90-minute feature documentary.

The new film will include, but will not be limited to, the events which have taken place from 2021 to the present day, including the matters set out in this article.

Before the film is completed, I want to provide those concerned with a proper opportunity to respond.

This article therefore forms part of that right of reply process.

Because there remains uncertainty about the continuing operation and effect of Unite's email restrictions, I am placing particular emphasis on the inquiry legal team to ensure that the information and questions set out above are brought directly to the attention of the relevant senior figures within Unite, including Sharon Graham and Stephen Pinder.

I would be grateful if the legal team would ensure that they are personally presented with this material and given the opportunity to respond.

Any substantive response received will be considered fairly and, where relevant, reflected in the forthcoming feature documentary.